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Jaynes invented the Brandeis Dice Problem as a simple illustration of the
MaxEnt (Maximum Entropy) procedure that he had demonstrated to work so
well in Statistical Mechanics. I construct here two alternative solutions to his
toy problem. One, like Jaynes’ solution, uses MaxEnt and yields an analogue
of the canonical ensemble, but at a different level of description. The other
uses Bayesian updating and yields an analogue of the micro-canonical ensemble.
Both, unlike Jaynes’ solution, yield error bars, whose operational merits I dis-
cuss. These two alternative solutions are not equivalent for the original Brandeis
Dice Problem, but become so in what must, therefore, count as the analogue of
the thermodynamic limit, M-sided dice with M →∞. Whereas the mathemat-
ical analogies between the dice problem and Stat Mech are quite close, there are
physical properties that the former lacks but that are crucial to the workings of
the latter. Stat Mech is more than just MaxEnt.
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1 Introduction
Jaynes introduced the following problem in his 1962 lectures for the Brandeis
Summer School (the underlining is his):
A die has been tossed a very large number N of times, and we are told
that the average number of spots per toss was not 3.5, as we might
expect from an honest die, but 4.5. Translate this information into
a probability assignment Pn, n = 1, 2, . . . , 6, for the n-th face to
come up on the next toss.
Jaynes then went on to solve this problem—now known as the Brandeis Dice
Problem—by using his celebrated1 MaxEnt procedure. That is, he maximized
the entropy S = −∑n Pn logPn, subject to the trivial constraint ∑n Pn = 1
and the less trivial
∑
n nPn = 〈B〉, where 〈B〉 denotes the observed average
number of spots (here, 〈B〉 = 4.5). The numerical solution thus obtained looks
quite reasonable at first sight (see the first two columns of Table 1), and it
seems clear that Jaynes intended this problem as an innocent little example of
the procedure that he had applied to the more serious problems of Statistical
Mechanics earlier in 1957. In particular, where it was known that the canonical
ensemble arises from maximizing the Gibbs entropy, subject to a constraint on
the expected value of the total energy, Jaynes’ novel epistemic interpretation
and justification of this procedure were that it takes into account what we know
(the constraint) but nothing more. Lack of knowledge is quantified properly by
Shannon’s entropy, which in turn equals (not just numerically but, on Jaynes’
viewpoint, also conceptually) the Gibbs entropy. The close relation between
Jaynes’ solution to the Brandeis Dice Problem and the canonical ensemble is
1For example, the MaxEnt workshop is, as of 2014, in its 34th incarnation.
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exemplified by the fact that his solution may be given in the form
Pn =
exp(−λn)
Z(λ)
, (1)
with the “partition function” given by Z(λ) =
∑
n exp(−λn), and with the term
exp(−λn) being the analogue of the Boltzmann factor. The Lagrange multiplier
λ is fixed by the constraint d lnZ(λ)/dλ = −〈B〉, and λ can be positive or
negative or zero, depending on whether 〈B〉 is smaller than, larger than, or equal
to 3.5 (the “honest value”).
It turned out, however, that the Brandeis Dice Problem was not so innocent
after all, and many criticisms were leveled against Jaynes’ solution (see, for exam-
ple, Rowlinson 1970 and Friedman and Shimony 1971). Although I will address
one particular criticism below, it is not the main purpose of this article to discuss
these criticisms in any detail or to defend Jaynes’ solution against them—Jaynes
is an entertaining defender of his own principles, see Jaynes 1978, 1985.2 Rather,
it is to point out that an alternative analogy of the canonical ensemble can be
obtained by applying the MaxEnt procedure at a different level of description,
involving a different sort of probabilities. That is, where Jaynes introduced de-
grees of belief about the die coming up n spots for n = 1 . . . 6, one can introduce
an underlying objective probability [aka chance] for the die to come up n spots,
and subsequently introduce degrees of belief about those chances. One can then
apply the MaxEnt procedure to the latter and thus obtain a second analogue of
the canonical ensemble. One argument in favor of this more involved procedure
is that Bayesian updating would, in fact, be applied at that same level. More-
over, it turns out that Bayesian updating then leads (in the limit N → ∞) to
the analogue of the micro-canonical ensemble. As far as I know this relation via
ensembles between the MaxEnt and Bayesian updating procedures has not been
2Not to mention that I agree with some criticisms, especially those of Skyrms (1985) and
Uffink (1996).
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noted before.
The two different types of probabilities that I propose to exploit here, one
objective chance, the other a subjective degree of belief, are sometimes referred
to as first-order and second-order probabilities, respectively (see, e.g., Kyburg
1988). This distinction was already made by Laplace, a fact that has not always
been appreciated (for a nice discussion of Laplace’s original writings, and much
more about probabilities of various kinds, I refer the reader to (Maher, 2010)). I
mention Laplace just because there is one criticism that has been raised against
Jaynes’ method as well as against Laplace’s Principle of Indifference and his
Rule of Succession (see Zabell 1989; see also the Appendix): that it ought to be
impossible to obtain any estimates of probabilities—let alone precise ones—from
a mere lack of knowledge. As a byproduct, this paper will show how Laplace and
Jaynes could have preempted, at least partially, this particular criticism, if they
had provided error bars (i.e., standard deviations) with their estimates. A few
hundred years late, I will provide those missing error bars and show that they
are quite large, of the same order of magnitude as the estimated probabilities
themselves. Thus, these estimates are not precise at all. This, then, is one benefit
of introducing both first-order and second-order probabilities: the latter come
automatically equipped with standard deviations. I will discuss in some detail
why these standard deviations are operationally useful in Section 3 below.
2 Two alternative solutions
I consider in this Section two alternative ways of interpreting the Brandeis Dice
Problem, and show how each interpretation leads to a solution that differs from
Jaynes’ original solution. One of these two solutions is based on Bayesian updat-
ing. While it has been discussed before by Uffink in 1996 (see also Porto Mana
2009 for an extensive numerical investigation of various alternative Bayesian up-
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dating procedures for this problem, as well as the role played by different priors),
my presentation emphasizes different aspects. The other solution is new, as far
as I know, and I will start with deriving it.
2.1 ...interpreted as imposing the constraint...
The Brandeis Dice Problem concerns what a Bayesian agent can say about her
degrees of belief in the (truth of) the following 6 propositions for n = 1, . . . 6:
Hn: On the next throw, this particular die will show n spots.
Let us denote these 6 degrees of belief by Pr(Hn is true)=: Pn, and assume no
other outcomes are considered by our agent, so that
∑
n Pn = 1.
When Jaynes presented his MaxEnt solution he formulated the problem as
follows (where I change his notation to mine)
Let us see what solution the Principle of Maximum Entropy gives for
this problem, if we interpret the data as imposing the mean value
constraint ∑
n
nPn = 4.5.
Let us for the moment accept this particular way of interpreting the problem,
namely, as imposing a constraint on the probabilities {Pn}. (I return to this
assumption in the next subsection.)
The probabilities {Pn} are subjective degrees of belief about propositions,
according to Jaynes. But we may in addition introduce objective probabilities,
or chances, in two different ways, first assuming that those chances are real (i.e.,
physical), or, second, assuming they are merely convenient mathematical entities.
First, then, we could imagine that the die in question is going to be thrown by
a precisely tuned mechanical device. Given how the mechanical device tosses
the sturdy die (with initial velocities of the die distributed, say, according a very
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narrow normal distribution) it seems we could introduce a possibly calculable
chance that the outcome of any toss will be n spots. Denote this chance by
cn. Our agent may then assign a probability (degree of belief) distribution over
~c := (c1, c2, . . . c6), which we denote by P˜r(~c). It is normalized by
∫
d~c P˜r(~c) = 1,
and the relation between Pn and P˜r(~c) is
Pn =
∫
d~c cnP˜r(~c). (2)
Now a radical anti-objectivist, like De Finetti (see his book from 1974), will deny
the existence of ~c as a real thing. But even so, if he agrees that the sequence
of tosses is exchangeable and extendible, then the probability of finding exactly
Mn times the result n (for n = 1 . . . 6) in N tosses is, according to the De Finetti
theorem, still of the form
Pr(M1,M2, . . .M6) =
∫
d~c P˜r(~c)
N !
M1!M2! . . .M6!
cM11 × cM22 . . .× cM66 , (3)
as if the underlying chances exist. Both ways of introducing the chances ~c suffice
for the purposes of this Section. For making the physical analogy with Statis-
tical Mechanics, as opposed to the purely mathematical analogies pursued here,
stronger, the first, objective, description may be preferable. See Section 4.
Jaynes’ constraint is now a constraint on the probability distribution P˜r:∫
d~c
∑
n
ncnP˜r(~c) =
∑
n
nPn = 〈B〉 . (4)
Accepting this, it is now obvious that the MaxEnt principle ought to be applied
to P˜r. The well-known obstacle in the way of straightforwardly translating this
principle into a condition on P˜r is the necessity of having to choose a measure
m(~c) on the space of the continuous variables ~c.3 That is, we ought to optimize
the relative entropy
S˜ := −
∫
d~c P˜r(~c) ln
[
P˜r(~c)
m(~c)
]
, (5)
3Jaynes’ solution avoids this problem by focusing on just discrete degrees of freedom, and
it may, therefore, be considered as the most straightforward solution of the toy problem.
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subject to normalization and the constraint (4). I will choose here the natural
looking m(~c) =constant, and return to this choice when discussing analogies and
disanalogies with Statistical Mechanics in Section 4.
The solution to the problem at hand is of the form
P˜r(~c) =
exp(−λ∑n ncn)
Z˜(λ)
, (6)
with the “partition function” given by
Z˜(λ) :=
∫
d~c exp(−λ
∑
n
ncn), (7)
and λ fixed by the transcendental equation
d ln Z˜(λ)
dλ
= −〈B〉 . (8)
(Just as for Jaynes’ solution, the sign of λ is easily seen to be the same as that
of 3.5− 〈B〉.) The numerical solution for 〈B〉 = 4.5 is tabulated in Table 1 and
may be compared to Jaynes’ solution. Even though both solutions use the same
constraint and both maximize the missing information, they differ, because they
employ different levels of description.
2.2 Bayesian Updating
As both Skyrms (1985) and Uffink (1996) have argued, there seems to be no par-
ticular reason why one would interpret Jaynes’ formulation of the Brandeis Dice
Problem as giving rise to a constraint on the probability distribution {Pn}. It
seems, within Bayesianism, more natural (and even mandatory) to use Bayesian
However, as Seidenfeld (1986) pointed out, even discrete variables are not immune from the
possibility of alternative descriptions: in this case one might consider the additional 1 or 2 sides
of the die that are visible after the toss, and apply MaxEnt to the larger number of degrees of
freedom that correspond to the more detailed description. Even though the additional degrees
of freedom may seem irrelevant, the MaxEnt solution thus obtained is different.
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Probability Jaynes Chances (Error bar)
P1 0.054 0.068 (0.069)
P2 0.079 0.083 (0.083)
P3 0.114 0.106 (0.103)
P4 0.165 0.145 (0.133)
P5 0.240 0.218 (0.176)
P6 0.347 0.380 (0.214)
Table 1: Jaynes’ MaxEnt solution to the Brandeis Dice Problem (second column)
compared with an alternative solution (third column) calculated in Section 2.1
that applies the MaxEnt procedure to degrees of belief about the chances to
throw n dots. The entry headed “(Error bar)” gives the standard deviation σn
in this alternative estimate of Pn, as calculated in Section 3.
updating, starting from a prior probability distribution that does not yet include
the information about the average number of dots in N throws. Importantly,
this prior distribution would be over chances, and so would, in fact, correspond
to P˜r.
The requirement of not including any information in the prior distribution,
leads, when we stick to the same measure m(~c)=constant as used in the preceding
subsection, to P˜rprior(~c) =C, with C a constant independent of ~c determined by
normalization,
C =
1∫
d~c δ(
∑
n cn − 1)
. (9)
One may, in fact, apply the MaxEnt procedure to obtain this particular prior
using normalization as the only constraint. (In a much more general context,
one may, as a rule, use MaxEnt to set the prior distribution on the probabilities
that underly one’s problem: see, e.g., Caticha and Preuss (2004). In that case,
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one subsequently uses Bayesian updating to modify this distribution in the light
of incoming empirical data.)
With this starting point the Bayesian updating solution is constructed as
follows. First, as an intermediate step, assume for the moment that the data
given consisted of the numbers of times Mn that n spots were observed in N
tosses of the die, so that
∑
nMn = N . In that case, the posterior distribution over
chances would be determined by Bayes’ rule as (cf. Eq. (3): the combinatorial
pre-factor drops out here, but it will reappear in (12) below)
P˜r
′
post(~c) =
cM11 × cM22 . . .× cM66∫
d~c cM11 × cM22 . . .× cM66
. (10)
Now the actual information provided in the Brandeis Dice Problem is (much)
less than this, and we only know that∑
n
nMn/N = 〈B〉 = 4.5. (11)
The posterior distribution is, in this case, a weighted average over those distri-
butions of the form (10) for which the constraint (11) is satisfied. So, up to an
overall normalization factor, we have
P˜rpost(~c) ∝
∑
M1,M2,...M6∑
n
nMn/N=〈B〉∑
n
Mn=N
N !
M1!M2! . . .M6!
cM11 × cM22 . . .× cM66 . (12)
This solution can be evaluated numerically for small values of N (Uffink 1996
presents results for several values of N up to 60). It differs from Jaynes’ solution
in general, even in the limit of N → ∞. Just in case the reader is surprised by
this, let me note that (i) Seidenfeld (1986) showed how updating and MaxEnt
procedures lead to equivalent results only in very special circumstances (and the
Brandeis Dice Problem does not constitute one of those special circumstances);
(ii) Skyrms (1987) argued that the MaxEnt procedure is not conceptually equal
to updating and as such one should not expect their results to be the same.
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The Bayesian updating solution actually becomes very simple in the limit of
N →∞.4 One gets (up to a normalization constant)
P˜r(~c) ∝ δ(
∑
n
ncn − 〈B〉)δ(
∑
n
cn − 1). (13)
The Bayesian updating solution for Pn in the limit N →∞ is, therefore,
Pn =
∫
d~c cnδ(
∑
n cn − 1)δ(
∑
n ncn − 〈B〉)∫
d~c δ(
∑
n cn − 1)δ(
∑
n ncn − 〈B〉)
. (14)
One may find the numerical results for the case 〈B〉 = 4.5 in Table 2, where they
are compared with Jaynes’ original solution.
Probability Jaynes Bayes (Error bar)
P1 0.054 0.062 (0.050)
P2 0.079 0.078 (0.062)
P3 0.114 0.103 (0.083)
P4 0.165 0.153 (0.125)
P5 0.240 0.262 (0.146)
P6 0.347 0.342 (0.196)
Table 2: Jaynes’ MaxEnt solution to the Brandeis Dice Problem (second col-
umn) compared with an alternative Bayesian updating solution (third column),
described in Section 2.2, for the limiting case where N →∞. The entry headed
“(Error bar)” gives the standard deviation σn in this alternative estimate of Pn,
as calculated in Section 3.
For completeness, I note that in this particular case another interesting com-
parison is with a die such that the average number of dots shown was actually
4This limit is what I take to be the intention behind Jaynes’ formulation of his toy problem
(“...a very large number N of times...”, see quote in the Introduction).
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3.5, as expected for a fair die. As Uffink (1996) showed, the Bayesian updating
solution for {Pn} is not what one might naively have expected, namely, the uni-
form probability distribution (Jaynes’ MaxEnt method does yield this uniform
solution). The solution is different, because the knowledge we have is quite dis-
tinct in the following two cases: (i) not knowing anything leads to the uniform
distribution for P˜r, which leaves open the possibility that the expected average
number of dots is anywhere between 1 and 6, and (ii) knowing that the expected
average number of dots in fact equals 〈B〉 = 3.5 eliminates almost all possible
distributions P˜r. In Table 3 I display the values of the probabilities in the lim-
iting case N → ∞ (Uffink provided values for several finite values of N for this
case, too).
Probability Bayes (Error bar)
P1 = P6 0.141 (0.095)
P2 = P5 0.166 (0.120)
P3 = P4 0.193 (0.153)
Table 3: Bayesian updating solution for 〈B〉 = 3.5 in the case N → ∞, as
calculated in Section 2.2.
3 Error bars
With the solutions based on P˜r(~c) in hand, we can do one more thing, namely,
evaluate the standard deviations in the estimates for Pn, defined as
σn :=
√∫
d~c c2nP˜r(~c)− P 2n . (15)
Tables 1 and 2 list these standard deviations for both alternative solutions con-
structed in Section 2. One sees that σn is quite large, of the same order of
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magnitude as Pn itself.
The large error bars are the reason for displaying fewer digits in Tables 1 and
2 than Jaynes originally did (he produced 5 digits), so as to avoid the misleading
impression of high precision. For the same reason, it seems somewhat futile to
argue about, say, whether Jaynes’ assignment of 34.7% to P6 is more reasonable
than the alternative assignments of P6 = 38% or P6 = 34.2%, respectively, given
that the error bar in the latter two (Jaynes’ estimate came without an error bar!)
is about 20% so that these results are not statistically significantly different.
Let me now discuss why error bars for probability estimates are useful. First
of all, I suppose it goes almost without saying that, in the case of physical
quantities, specifying just the average observed value is in general not sufficient
to yield reliable knowledge. A well-known case in point is provided by the story
of the man who drowned in a river that he knew to be 1m deep on average.
The quantities we are interested in here, however, are (subjective) probabili-
ties, not physical quantities. Such probabilities are relied upon when betting. If
one places just a single bet on the occurrence of one particular event, then all
one needs to know is one’s degree of belief in that occurrence. The standard de-
viation does not matter, and acceptable odds on the bet are determined entirely
by one’s degree of belief. However, as soon as one places a bet on two events of
the same type, the standard deviation does play a role. In fact, if one bets on
the occurrence of two subsequent identical outcomes n in our dice experiment,
then the correct probability assigned to that combination of events is
Pnn =
∫
d~c P˜r(~c)c2n = P
2
n + σ
2
n, (16)
and not simply P 2n . It is clear, furthermore, that one would need to specify the
covariance matrix Pnm =
∫
d~c P˜r(~c)cncm for all combinations (n,m) if one were to
place bets on all possible pairs of outcomes. (And, of course, knowing P˜r allows
one to calculate higher-order moments, namely, those necessary to determine
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acceptable odds for bets on more than two events.)
Interestingly, Jaynes discusses in his 1978 overview paper the probability one
ought to assign to the occurrence of two particular events in a row. He admits
he needs the covariance matrix Pnm, but he cannot obtain it from his solution.
Jaynes states that his “maximum-entropy solution does not, and cannot, make
any statement about frequencies” and that it applies only to predictions of the
single toss of the die. He subsequently does proceed to provide a possible range
of values for Pnm based on the assumption that the tosses of the die form an
exchangeable sequence, but he stops short of applying the De Finetti theorem.
4 Comparison with Statistical Mechanics
Eq. (13) shows that Bayesian updating leads to a mathematical analogue of the
micro-canonical ensemble, whereas Eq. (6) shows that the MaxEnt procedure
applied at the same level of description leads to a mathematical analogue of the
canonical ensemble. In this Section I will consider these purely mathematical
analogies in more detail. Subsequently I will discuss some essential disanalogies,
concerning physical aspects, between the Brandeis Dice Problem and Statistical
Mechanics.
4.1 Canonical ensemble analogies
Here I compare the two different MaxEnt solutions of the Brandeis Dice Problem
with two different physical canonical ensembles, describing two different physical
systems. In Table 4 I list the microscopic variables, the measure on the space
of those variables, and the Boltzmann factor for these two physical systems.
The first system is an ideal gas of Np classical distinguishable particles. The
microscopic variables are continuous and are chosen to be canonically conjugated
Draft submitted to Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
Stat Mecha Stat Mechb Chances Jaynes
micro variables ~rn, ~pn |n〉 ~cn n
range of n n = 1 . . .Np n = 1 . . .∞ n = 1 . . . 6 n = 1 . . . 6
measure Πn
∫
d~rn
∫
d~pn /h
3N
∑
n Πn
∫
d~cn
∑
n
Boltzmann factor exp[−β∑n ~p2n/(2mn)] exp(−βαn2) exp[−λ∑n ncn] exp[−λn]
Table 4: Four canonical ensembles: Stat Mecha refers to a gas of Np classical
distinguishable noninteracting particles, Stat Mechb refers to a single quantum
particle of mass m in a 1D infinite square well of length L. The constant α has
the value α = h2/(8mL2) with h Planck’s constant. The constant β, as usual,
stands for β = 1/(kBT ), with kB Boltzmann’s constant and T the temperature.
β may be interpreted as a Lagrange multiplier, just like λ in the solutions to the
dice problem. One notices the close analogies between the entries in the “Stat
Mecha” and “Chances” columns, as well as those between the “Stat Mechb” and
“Jaynes” columns.
pairs. I picked position and momentum, but there are alternatives, in particular,
action-angle variables. The measure on the space is not actually determined
by classical physics, but it follows from quantum mechanics that the correct
measure is
∫
d~r
∫
d~p/h3 for each particle, with h Planck’s constant. This case
is manifestly analogous to the alternative MaxEnt solution: the microscopic
variables are continuous, and they are enumerated by a discrete variable n, which
runs to Np in the physical case, and to M = 6 in the dice case. The measure
is an Np-fold integral or an M-fold integral over the continuous variables. Thus,
the number of particles, Np, is analogous to the number of sides of the die, M .
The second physical situation concerns a single spinless quantum particle in
a 1D infinite square well. The one (discrete) variable describing the state is
the quantum number n for energy. Jaynes’ MaxEnt solution is mathematically
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analogous to this case. The microscopic variable is discrete, and the measure is
simply a sum over all n. One difference is that in the quantum case the range
of values of the integer n is unlimited (even for a single particle), while in the
die case it is limited to n = 1...M , but this difference could be eliminated by
simply (even if artificially) imposing an upper limit to the energy of the quantum
particle.
4.2 The thermodynamic limit
The above identifications allow us to find the analogue of the thermodynamic
limit. Since for the classical ideal gas this limit corresponds to the limit Np →∞,
the straightforward analogue for the alternative MaxEnt solution is the limit
M →∞ for M-sided dice.
To see this in more detail, it is illuminating to consider the equivalence,
within Stat Mech, of the canonical and micro-canonical ensembles in the ther-
modynamic limit. The reason for this equivalence is that the density of states,
ρ(E), tends to increase monotonically with energy E, so that the probability
density for finding a state with a particular energy in the canonical ensemble
(which is the product of the density ρ(E) with the decaying Boltzmann factor
exp(−βE)) has a maximum around the mean energy 〈E〉. This maximum be-
comes more pronounced with increasing number of degrees of freedom and in the
thermodynamic limit the canonical distribution becomes a delta function, hence
equal to the micro-canonical distribution δ(E − 〈E〉).
For the Brandeis Dice Problem, let us define the analogue of E as
B :=
M∑
n=1
ncn, (17)
in terms of the chances cn and the number of sides, M = 6. The analogue of
the density of states, denoted by ρ(B), is then the number of solutions for ~c
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given a value of B. This function is not a monotonically increasing function of
B. Instead, it reaches a maximum for the “honest value”, B = (1 + 6)/2 = 3.5.
In particular, it is a decreasing function of B for B > 3.5, and an increasing
function for B < 3.5. As noted before, the Lagrange multiplier λ is negative for
〈B〉 > 3.5 and positive for 〈B〉 < 3.5. In either case, it follows that the “canonical
distribution” ρ(B) exp(−λB) will reach a maximum for a value of B around
〈B〉. But this maximum is by no means infinitely sharp for a standard die. The
“canonical ensemble” (obtained by the MaxEnt procedure) does not, therefore,
reduce to the “micro-canonical ensemble” obtained by Bayesian updating. The
reason is that the number of degrees of freedom is so small: there are just 5
independent chances cn. In the limit M →∞, however, the maximum becomes
sharp.
This analogy between the number of gas particle and the number of sides of
the die also explains why the error bars σn in the estimates for Pn are so large,
relatively speaking. For a macroscopic gas, the fluctuations of the physical state
variables around thermal equilibrium are of relative size 1/
√
Np. These relative
fluctuations, therefore, go to zero in the thermodynamic limit and are very small
for typical macroscopic numbers (say, Np ≈ 1023). For the dice problem, in
contrast, M is by no means large and 1/
√
M is appreciable.
4.3 Disanalogies
The analogies discussed above are all of a mathematical sort. Physically, there
are certain obvious differences between the dice problem and typical Statisti-
cal Mechanics problems. These differences may teach us something about the
relation between Stat Mech and MaxEnt. Here is a small list:
First, energy conservation plays a crucial role in Stat Mech. We arrive at the
canonical and micro-canonical ensembles by imposing conditions on the average
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or the total energy of a system, respectively. It makes sense to do that only
because energy is conserved. Imagine, in contrast, that we somehow managed to
measure the quantity A :=
∑
n ~p
4
n of a gas at some instant of time. After one col-
lision, this quantity would already have a different value. On an extremely short
time scale, therefore, our knowledge of the value of A would become obsolete—
unless we could follow the precise microscopic dynamics and thus keep track of
the rapidly changing value of A— and we could not apply the corresponding
micro-canonical ensemble. The Brandeis Dice Problem has no conservation law
(of the number of spots, for instance). Rather, by construction, the toy problem
has no dynamics at all as soon as we assume exchangeability to hold for the
sequence of tosses.
Second, for Statistical Mechanical problems the appropriate settings for the
two ensembles are clear: one uses the micro-canonical ensemble for an isolated
system (whose energy is conserved) and the canonical ensemble is used for a
small system in thermal contact with a large reservoir, such that reservoir plus
small system are isolated. There are no analogues of reservoirs for the Brandeis
Dice Problem, nor of the exchange of energy. Rather, as we have seen, Bayesian
updating leads to the micro-canonical ensemble whereas MaxEnt leads to the
canonical ensemble.
Third, for the dice problem, there is a choice on what level of description the
MaxEnt procedure is to be applied, and that is why one may construct (at least)
two canonical ensembles. Moreover, even if we have settled on the probability
distribution P˜r(~c) as the appropriate level of description, there is still the choice
of the measure m(~c). The Statistical Mechanical canonical ensemble of a given
physical system, on the other hand, is unique, because the appropriate way of
counting states is uniquely determined by the laws of quantum mechanics: one
uses the dimension of the Hilbert space spanned by states of a given energy. This
sets the appropriate level of description as well as which measure to use.
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Finally, there is yet another way to treat dice problems, namely, by treating
the dice as physical systems. We could, in principle, consider all relevant mi-
croscopic physical variables that determine the motion of the die as it is tossed.
This may include the positions and momenta of the ambient air molecules, the
condition of the surface on which the die will fall, and so on and so forth. By
doing this we would have more than just a mathematical analogy, but we also
would have lost sight of the fact that we were merely trying to pose and solve an
illustrative toy problem. Conversely,5 we could enhance the analogy by treating
Stat Mech problems in a nonstandard way: we could introduce chances for the
physical system to be in given microstates, and then introduce degrees of belief
about those chances.
5 Conclusions
I presented two solutions to the Brandeis Dice Problem that differ from Jaynes’
original solution. One used the MaxEnt procedure (but at a different level of
description than Jaynes did), the other Bayesian updating. The former gave rise
to a mathematical analogue of the canonical ensemble, the latter to an analogue
of the micro-canonical ensemble.
The Bayesian updating and MaxEnt solutions (and thereby the analogues of
the micro-canonical and canonical ensembles) are not equivalent, but I showed
how they become equivalent in what would have to be the analogue of the ther-
modynamic limit, namely the Brandeis Dice Problem generalized to M-sided
dice with M →∞.
The main advantage of the two new solutions is that they automatically come
equipped with error bars. These error bars for the dice problem are large and
they remind us that lack of knowledge, as encoded by the MaxEnt principle,
5As pointed out by one of the referees.
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does not lead to precise estimates of probabilities. Moreover, such error bars are
necessary for the calculation of joint probabilities for the outcomes of two dice
tosses. Jaynes had explicitly noted that his solution does not and cannot answer
questions about joint probabilities.
Purely physical considerations, such as conservation of energy and the exis-
tence of thermal reservoirs, play no role in the Brandeis Dice Problem, but are
crucial in standard Statistical Mechanics. This shows in what sense Stat Mech
is more than just an application of MaxEnt.
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Appendix: Laplace’s Rule of Succession
This Appendix provides error bars for Laplace’s “Rule of Succession.” This rule
concerns a situation in which there are M possible outcomes of an experiment,
and one has observed one particular outcome k times out of m cases in total.
Then, according to the Rule of Succession, the probability assigned to the next
case having that outcome should be Pk;m = (k + 1)/(m + M). This includes
as a special case the assignment of probability P0,0 = 1/6 to n spots (for any
n = 1 . . . 6) coming up on the throw of a die for which we know nothing except
that the die hasM = 6 sides, one if which is guaranteed to come up. Interestingly,
the Rule of Succession is equivalent to assuming a flat distribution for P˜r. That
is, not only does the Rule of Succession follow (straightforwardly) from a flat
distribution, the converse statement, that a flat distribution for P˜r is implied by
the Rule of Succession, is true, too (see Zabell 1989).
Thanks to this equivalence, the standard deviation in the estimate 1/6 for an
unknown six-sided die to come up with any particular side follows immediately
from the Rule of Succession itself (since the probability to see n spots turn up
on the second toss given that the first toss produced n spots is 2/7):
σ2 =
1
6
× 2
7
−
(
1
6
)2
=
5
7
× 1
36
, (18)
so that
σ =
√
35
42
≈ 0.141. (19)
Again one sees that the standard deviation is almost as large as the probability,
1/6, itself. For completeness, I note that the standard deviation in the general
probability estimate of Pk;m with the same method is found to be
σ2k;m =
(k + 1)(M +m− k − 1)
(m+M)2(m+M + 1)
. (20)
